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1 Introduction
The Ministry of the Interior coordinates preventive work against violent extremism nation-
ally, and the work is divided between several actors. Municipalities, civic society organi-
sations and communities participate in the cooperation in accordance with the National 
Action Plan. The first National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and 
Extremism was published in 2012. The Action Plan was revised in 2012 taking into account 
the changes in the operating environment, and it is in use at the time of writing the as-
sessment. The upcoming National Action Plan will be published later in 2019.
In the Action Plan and in this report, violent extremism refers to using, threatening with, 
encouraging or justifying violence based on one’s own view of the world or on ideological 
grounds. The National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extrem-
ism from 2016 lists the measures and the authorities, civic society organisations and com-
munities participating in the work. The plan is built around measures that are discussed in 
more detail later in this assessment. The Action Plan contains goals, which are tried to be 
reached by various measures. Responsible parties have been appointed for the goals of 
the plan, and their task is to ensure the implementation of measures. Reaching the short-
term goals set has been assessed as a part of this assessment.
The Ministry of the Interior has procured an assessment from KPMG on the achievement 
of the short-term goals of the current action plan, the recognition of the actors’ roles and 
tasks as well as of the local cooperation in various parts of Finland. As a part of the assess-
ment, recommendations to the upcoming action plan are made based on the observed 
successes and challenges.
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1.1 National short-term goals 
The national short-term (the end of 2018) goals for preventing violent radicalisation and 
extremism are as follows: 
1. National and local structures and procedures based on multi-professional 
cooperation are in place which makes it possible for the authorities, 
organisations and communities to prevent violent radicalisation and 
extremism. 
2. The volume of ideologically motivated crime will continue to decrease year 
by year compared to the previous year. 
3. The number of those travelling from Finland to conflict areas for the 
purpose of engaging in combat/violence will start to go down from its 
peak. The starting date is 1 November 2015. 
4. Those returning from conflict areas are identified. The ones having 
committed crimes will be brought to justice. All returning persons will be 
systematically targeted with individually tailored measures which reduce 
the risk of violence and help improve their ability to cope. 
5. The police will efficiently detect and investigate hate crimes. The victims 
of hate crime will be supported and the impacts of crime on the victim’s 
reference group will be identified. 
1.2 Different actors
It is stated in the action plan that the field in which violent radicalisation and extremism is 
being prevented is wide, and a number of actors possess responsibilities, competency and 
resources for this purpose. The key actors within the subject have been listed in the ac-
tion plan. In addition to the listed actors, also other actors work around the phenomenon, 
who as a part of their own work do preventive work, as well as parties who otherwise are 
involved in the cooperation. A part of the parties involved in the cooperation have joined 
during the implementation of the action plan. Also, cooperation forums and groups in the 
prevention of violent extremism joining together different actors work within the subject.
1.2.1 Actors named in the action plan
The focal actors named in the action plan are the politicians and decision-makers, the 
social services, the healthcare services, the youth services, the education sector, the po-
lice, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, civic society organisations and religious 
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communities as well as the family and friends. The role of the central actors is described 
briefly as it is described in the action plan and observed in the interviews.
The functions of social services include the evaluation of the need for special support, 
such as benefits for employment or livelihood. Correct actions may have a make-or-break 
effect from the perspective of the radicalisation process. Child protection measures are 
employed when the person who runs the risk of becoming radicalised or who is already 
radicalised is under 18 years of age or has underage children. 
Healthcare services provides maternity and child health clinic services as well as school 
and student healthcare services from which the persons may be further guided to other 
services. Even if violent radicalisation and extremism are not mental illnesses per se, inter-
national research and experiences indicate that there is a strong correlation with mental 
health problems. This being the case, mental health services play an important role in the 
preventive work.
Youth services encounter many adolescents and carry out actions that strengthen the 
adolescents’ involvement, media literacy and ability to counter violence-inducing propa-
ganda. Youth services can also notice changes occurring in adolescents and intervene in 
the situation. Youth services guides adolescents to join in youth work.
The role of the education sector in the preventive work is seen focal. Teachers notice vari-
ous signs relating to radicalisation and can steer towards services. Many of the responsibil-
ities given to the education sector are already included in the existing structures, such as 
the media literacy skills and discernment included in the curricula. During the interviews, 
the readiness to face a person at risk of radicalisation and the ability to discuss the phe-
nomenon when the subject arises were seen important by the professionals in education.
The police are an important actor in the preventive work. As a part of maintaining gen-
eral order and safety as well as preventing crimes, the police also come across persons 
who are about to become radicalised or who are already radicalised. The anchor model is 
arranged within police departments, and through it the police have an important role in 
implementing multi-professional cooperation where radicalised persons are encountered. 
The role of the police is not limited to the direct crime prevention and detection, but the 
police have an important role in finding help for persons already radicalised or at risk of it, 
irrespective of whether the question concerns only the police itself, another authority or 
an organisation.
The task of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service is to prevent and reject the most seri-
ous threats to the national security. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service monitors the 
development of violent radicalisation and extremism and the situation picture. The Finnish 
10
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:19
Security Intelligence Service cooperates with the local police and provides expert assis-
tance to the other authorities.  
Civic society organisations provide services which help people disengage from violence, 
as well as offering mentoring and other similar services which make it easier to renounce 
ideals that condone the use of violence, while at the same time providing an avenue for 
non-violent social activism. The role of civic society organisations is important especially in 
situations where the authorities’ possibility to provide support ends or the trust in the au-
thorities is shaken. The action plan contains a lot of references to the cooperation between 
civic society organisations and the authorities. 
Religious communities can offer important mental support and for their part prevent the 
misuse of religion as a vehicle justifying violence. They have a possibility to be credible ac-
tors in the eyes of a radicalised person in matters related to religious interpretation, and by 
working together, religious communities can act against violence and spread the message 
that violence can never be justified on the basis of religion.
1.2.2 Cooperation forums
Different cooperation forums bring together actors operating within the subject nation-
ally, locally and per field. Through cooperation forums, also other central actors listed in 
the action plan are involved in the prevention of radicalisation and extremism. Nationally 
the most central network is the National Cooperation Network for the Prevention of Violent 
Extremism coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior. The cooperation network consists 
of actors around Finland, authorities from different sectors and civic society organisation 
operators. The tasks of the group are the preparation of training related to the prevention 
of violent radicalisation and extremism, research, prevention of local situation pictures, pro-
motion of local work, preparation of the EXIT operation and other services as well as coop-
eration and communication with communities. The implementation and results of the ac-
tion plan are monitored by a steering group where organisations of paramount importance 
to carrying out measures are represented. The steering group will annually approve the op-
erating plan which describes the actions and the schedule of the calendar year in detail. 
Local networks within the subject are operating in Helsinki, Tampere, Turku and Oulu. 
Local networks contain parties who are deemed important cooperation partners in each 
location. The extent and scope of the action are determined on the local level. In addition, 
the steering groups of the projects (e.g. MuVenna, Radinet, Reach Out) form cooperation 
forums around the subject which locally and nationally bring together different actors.
Internationally, good practices are shared through different seminars and cooperation 
networks. The involvement in the EU cooperation has been active especially through the 
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Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). The network has provided information on the 
phenomenon to actors in the practical level and enabled their understanding of their own 
work in a bigger picture.
1.3 Implementation of the assessment
The assessment has been realised by getting acquainted with the background material 
provided by the Ministry of the Interior and various actors and by interviewing the central 
actors. The background materials used, and the actors interviewed, are exhaustively listed 
in the list of sources. The interviews were executed partly individually and partly as group 
interviews. The starting point used was the actors listed in the action plan, besides which 
actors were interviewed who participate in the work of the National Cooperation Network 
or are otherwise active in the cooperation within the subject. Furthermore, in the meet-
ings of the local cooperation networks in Helsinki, Tampere, Turku and Oulu were partici-
pated. In connection with the cooperation networks, persons and actors actively involved 
in local cooperation were interviewed.
In the interviews, representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the National Institute for Health and Welfare, 
the National Police Board, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, the Finnish National 
Agency for Education, the Finnish Immigration Service and the Criminal Sanctions Agency 
were met. In addition, persons involved in the anchor model, researchers of the Univer-
sity of Helsinki, persons participated in the continuing education HY+ of the department 
of teacher education, representatives of the HY+ education and representatives of early 
childhood education from Helsinki and Kirkkonummi were met. Civic society organisation 
representatives from the Finn Church Aid, the Vuolle Settlement, the Muslim Youth Forum 
of Turku, Mahdi Youth Society and MuVenna project were interviewed. Representatives of 
religions were also met with.
In the interviews, the actors’ own roles in preventive work and in cooperation with other 
parties were clarified. The participation in international, national and local cooperation 
forums was reviewed. Information on the effectiveness of the National Action Plan was 
collected from the actors and development proposals for the preventive work in Finland 
were examined.
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2 Summary
2.1 Measures and roles
The National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism con-
tains 12 measures, which encompass 36 subsections. The measures differ from general 
level measures to strategical level measures. A part of the measures is aimed to improve 
the preconditions for preventive work, for example, by creating structures and joint proce-
dures. Correspondingly, the scope of the measures deviates. The measures are aimed from 
the early level preventive work at persons who are at risk of becoming radicalised and at 
persons already radicalised. The action plan is in this respect exhaustive and it does not 
have significant gaps.
The most significant actors around the phenomenon have been recognised in the action 
plan. The list of the actors was not fully comprehensive upon the writing of the plan but 
the cooperation partners were supplemented as the implementation of the plan pro-
ceeded, for example, through the inclusion of the early childhood education. All actors 
interviewed recognised their own role in the preventive work. The formation of the total 
picture on the other actors’ role is partly lacking due to the diversity of the phenomenon, 
the general lack of information and the number of the parties involved.
2.2 Short-term recommendations
When assessing the short-term goals of the action plan, it must be noted that the possibil-
ities of this action plan to affect them are limited. International events may have a bigger 
impact on many matters. It does not mean that goals should not also try to be reached by 
national measures. The goals listed in the action plan have largely been reached from the 
point of view that measures have been directed at them or that no close conclusions can 
be drawn in the light of the available information.
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1. Structures for multi-professional cooperation and cooperation between 
authorisations, civic society organisations and communities have 
been created even though there are local differences in structures and 
cooperation. 
2. It is difficult to see large changes in the volume of ideologically motivated 
actions partly for the reason that due to varying statistics no exact 
conclusions can be drawn from the figures. 
3. The number of persons leaving for the conflict area in Iraq and Syria has 
lessened as ISIL has suffered military losses.
4. An operating model for identifying persons returning from conflict areas 
and for measures directed at the returning persons has been created, 
which was approved in spring 2017.
5. Additional funding was given in 2017 for the research and disclosure 
of hate crimes, and the police were trained in the subject, which has 
intensified the action. A large number of hate crimes remains unreported, 
and due to that the support of victims is difficult.
2.3 The most important successes
The most important successes of the action plan can be seen the following:
1.   M U LT I - P R O F E S S I O N A L  CO O P E R AT I O N  A N D  T H E  I N V O LV E M E N T  O F  C I V I C 
S O C I E T Y  O R G A N I S AT I O N S : 
• The cooperation is seen important both at local and national level because everyone views 
the intricate phenomenon from their own point of view. Civic society organisations have the 
possibility to operate where the authorities’ resources end or no trust is found.
• Preconditions for the cooperation have been created by bringing actors around the same 
table in national and local cooperation forums, which has help in creating a common 
situation picture and networking the actors.
• Multi-professional operating models such as the Anchor model are valuable when matters 
are tried to be solved extensively from the root causes.
2.   CO N S T R U C T I V E N E S S  A N D  P R O AC T I V E  W O R K  A S  A  S TA R T I N G  P O I N T: 
• The actors aim to build their own preventive work proactively and do things so that the 
preventive work becomes a part of the organisation’s structures. 
• The actors are aware that single projects suit for testing operating models but not for 
continuous action.
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2.4 The most important challenges
The biggest challenges in the action plan are:
3.   E M P H A S I S  O N  T H E  N E C E S S I T Y  O F  I N F O R M AT I O N : 
• A strong consensus prevails among the actors that the preventive work must be based on 
researched information. 
• During the implementation of the plan, more resources were aimed at the scientific 
research and the actors have compiled their own guidebooks on the matter.
1.  G A P S  A N D  F LO W  O F  I N F O R M AT I O N  B E T W E E N  T H E  AC TO R S 
• The actors recognise that the biggest risk in the preventive work is situations where a 
person is transferred from one actor to another. Despite that, the largest part of the practical 
work is directed at the development of one’s own actions. The cooperation is largely based 
on a person, in which case the replacement of persons may significantly weaken the 
cooperation between the actors.
• Furthermore, the flow of information forms a problem in the cooperation between the 
actors especially due to different interpretations of law and therefore it is difficult to create 
joint operating models.
2.  C I V I C  S O C I E T Y  O R G A N I S AT I O N  F U N D I N G   
• The actions of civic society organisations are seen important in the preventive work, and 
they have a clear role in those areas where the authorities’ actions end or are not purposeful. 
Funding in preventive work is based on project funding, which does not guarantee 
continuity. The risk is that the work goes down the drain and long-term trust is not built.
3.  S T R U C T U R I N G  T H E  P H E N O M E N O N
• The phenomenon is mainly well-understood but its structuring is lacking. The starting point 
brought up in the principles of the preventive work is that the preventive work is focused 
on such groups or persons who are at risk of becoming violently radicalised or who already 
are radicalised. 
• In respect of many actors, the preventive work is seen more extensively and other matters 
within public policy are connected to it. The extensive perspective is partly well-founded 
but it may expand the actions too much and lose focus from the action.
15
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:19 ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE PREVENTION OF 
 VIOLENT RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM BY THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
2.5 Recommendations to the next action plan
The authors of the assessment recommend that the next action plan pay attention to the 
following points:
1. Clarification of the interfaces between actors and, thus, the description of 
the roles between the actors more extensively in the next action plan.
2. Emphasis on the cooperation between actors by establishing measures 
extending the actors’ scope of operation where actions are developed 
despite the borders between the actors.
3. Taking into account in the structures and training that a radicalised person 
is encountered successfully, paying attention to how and by whom the 
encounter with a radicalised person takes place, without adding to a single 
person’s risk of becoming radicalised.
4. The training of practical actors should have more exact goals and priorities 
so that the lacking resources are directed correctly. The envisioned web-
based training and self-study packages may help in the situation.
5. Arrangement of the civic society organisations’ funding so that the 
continuity of operation is secured, and the knowhow accrued during the 
project can be utilised.
4.  R E Q U I R E M E N T  A N D  G O A L S  O F  T R A I N I N G
• No clear goals or priorities have been set from the training of practical actors. There is 
disagreement on the goals of training especially in respect of in which role the recognition 
of radicalisation should be.
• The actors’ resources available for training do not correspond to the acknowledged need of 
training from the point of view of the training organiser or participant. 
• In addition, training material has been poorly available, especially for self-study purposes. 
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3 Measures of the plan
The action plan contains several goals for the prevention of violent radicalisation and ex-
tremism. The goals of the measures in the plan have been written down in connection 
with the measure promoting their achievement. The measures, their subsections and de-
fined goals are discussed according to the division made in the action plan.
In figure 1, the measures are classified based on their allocation and goals. The measures 
are classified based on their allocation and the goal of the preventive work. The allocation 
refers to a measure focused primarily either on an individual (Individual) or a wider group 
(Group) or whether the purpose of the measure is to improve general operating condi-
tions in preventive work (General). The goal of the preventive work refers to which part of 
the radicalisation process is wished to be affected by the measure. A measure aimed at a 
wider population aims to realise changes in a wider scale, such as the prevention of social 
exclusion and the development of critical thinking (Population). Correspondingly, meas-
ures directed at persons being at risk of becoming radicalised or already in the process 
aim to prevent radicalisation in a targeted fashion or stop the already started radicalisation 
(Risk Group). The aim of measures directed at radicalised persons is, for example, to detach 
the person from violent behaviour and reduce the threat of violence directed at the rest of 
the society (Radicalised Persons).
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Table 1. The classification of measures according to the focus and target
The largest part of the measures is classified as general level measures. Their primary 
aim is to improve cooperation, create structures, increase information and expertise and 
strengthen critical thinking. Three of the measures are clearly of the individual level and 
two partly. The individual level goals are typically directed at individuals who are at risk of 
becoming radicalised or who have already become radicalised (or their close circle). The 
individual level goals are more concrete in the action plan than the general level goals. 
For example, target groups and goals have been clearly determined for RADINET (exit) 
operation and Helpline support function. There are altogether three measures in the plan 
directed at a larger group. These are directed at the victims of hate crimes, asylum seekers 
and various forms of violent radicalisation and extremism.
The action plan contains two measures which aim to prevent radicalisation of a wider 
group in a very early stage who are not actually at a specific risk of becoming violently rad-
icalised. The principle of the action plan states that such measures belong to the scope of 
social policy and, thus, they are not subject to this action plan. The most part of the meas-
ures are directed at those persons who are at the biggest risk of becoming radicalised or 
who have already become radicalised. The measures differ in their work amount and effec-
tivity so no direct conclusions can be drawn from the volume of the measures on how the 
preventive work has been focused. Nevertheless, it can be stated that preventive work has 
been performed in the action plan very extensively from the point of view of the goal of 
the operation.
Action Goal of the preventiveactionActors
Action 1: Coordination and cooperation GeneralGeneral
Action 3: RADINET (exit) function Risk group / RadicalizedIndividual
Action 4: Helpline support service RadicalizedIndividual
Action 5: Radicalized guided to join organizations RadicalizedIndividual
Action 6: Increasing competence and knowledge Risk group / RadicalizedGeneral
Action 7: Hate crimes Risk group / RadicalizedIndividual / Group
Action 8: Refugees Population / Risk groupGroup
Action 9: Communications Risk groupGeneral
Action 10: Critical thinking by children and the youth PopulationGeneral
Action 11:  Special responsibilities by the police Risk group / Radicalized
Individual / 
General
Action 12: Actions directed at different forms of action RadicalizedGroup
Action 2: Efficient and functional structures Risk group / RadicalizedGeneral
Not implemented
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3.1.1 Coordinating preventive work, sharing good practices and increasing 
expertise 
The coordination of the preventive work has succeeded as set out in the action plan. The 
responsibility for the measure belongs to the Ministry of the Interior, and in practice, the 
coordination takes place through the actions by the National Cooperation Network. The 
creation of the cooperation network has succeeded so that authorities, Civic society or-
ganisations and religious communities are involved in it. The group convenes regularly. 
The operation has been developed according to the changes in the operating environ-
ment, for example, by involving new actors in the group. According to the interviews, the 
cooperation network has managed in the creation of the total and situation picture as well 
as connections by bringing in actors from different sectors. What should be especially de-
veloped in the operation of the cooperation network is that more exact goals are set for 
the operation and concrete development projects are created as drivers of the network.
Seminars have been organised to increase expertise, and information is distributed at the 
meetings of the network between the actors. Good practices are shared between the co-
operation network based on the successes reached in the actors’ own operation. The pro-
gress of the action plan has been monitored in the situation reports and annual reports 
published from 2013 by the Ministry of the Interior.
International good practices from elsewhere in Europe are taken into account in the ac-
tion plan. They are, for example, obtained through participation via the Radicalisation 
Awareness Network (RAN). The significance of international cooperation was brought up 
in almost all interviews. Good practices are sought from abroad by several sectors, and the 
obtained knowledge are disclosed forward in national and local cooperation forums. 
3.1.2 Creating effective and functional structures and procedures
The aim of the measure is to ensure that all parts of the country have readiness and per-
manent structures for the prevention. The multi-professional Anchor model functioning in 
connection with police departments is largely discussed in the action plan. The goal of the 
Anchor model is the multi-professional early intervention in the situation of an adolescent 
with the purpose of promoting the adolescent’s wellbeing and preventing crimes. Experts 
of the police, social services, healthcare services and youth services work in the Anchor 
team. The operation is agreed on locally with the participants. The Anchor team also co-
operates with other actors, such as various actors of municipalities, schools, civic society 
organisations, hobby and sport clubs, as well as religious communities. Anchor teams also 
work with persons already radicalised or at risk of becoming radicalised. The action plan 
determines three different levels, the structures of which correspond to various regional 
needs. The minimum level, the basic level and the high level determine the readiness of 
the Anchor model to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism according to the local 
operating environment and the situation picture.
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Due to the diversity and different levels of the operation, the inclusion of measures in 
structures is easier to some. For example, a part of the measures has been included in the 
curricula at schools, and the question for the police is largely of the implementation of 
previous goals. The inclusion of the prevention of violent extremism in the structures was 
deemed an important target, and the actors feel that through that the quality of services 
and the national accessibility can be guaranteed.
A good example of the local actions is the When Concern Arises model created in Tam-
pere. A procedure has been created in the model, which guides the different actors of mu-
nicipalities when concern arises relating to radicalisation. The same kind of development 
work has also been done in other places.
3.1.3 Launching RADINET (exit) service
In Vuolle Settlement Radinet project, an operating model has been developed where the 
disengagement of radicalised persons from violence and from the sphere of influence of 
violent groups is supported. Similar exit models are also in use elsewhere in Europe. The 
action is systematic, targeting the individual, and voluntary. The aim of the service is for 
the person in question to renounce ideologically motivated violence or disengage from it. 
The Radinet exit service was launched in 2016 by the Vuolle Settlement. The objective was 
to create a service which reaches customers around Finland. The persons participating in 
the service worked in Oulu and Helsinki, but customers were also reached from other cit-
ies. During the first operating year, an exit model was created, the network was built, and 
the phenomenon was reviewed. As the operating continued, more focus was aimed at the 
training and customer service of the mentors. The steering group included the key author-
ities regarding the action. Further funding was applied for the project, but funding was 
not continued, and the service ended at the end of 2018.
Radinet provided impartial, confidential and civic society organisation-based support 
when individuals wished to detach themselves from violent extreme thinking and actions. 
Such exit work as provided by Radinet was deemed necessary in the interviews because 
corresponding service is not available nationwide. Radinet’s work was praised over sector 
borders, and the created exit model was considered successful. It is also worth noting the 
wide recognisability gained by Radinet and the creation of networks where the employees 
of the projects had an important role.
Radinet’s customer numbers are available and based on them it can be stated that Rad-
inet reached a lot of people. All customers have not been assessed systematically by an 
assessment model based on systematic scientific evidence, so it is difficult to assess how 
radicalised the persons were. Approximately one half of the customers were directed to 
Radinet through authorities, where the assessment methods are at least partially in use, 
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so it is probable that a large part of the customers was in actual need of help. The effectiv-
ity of the method to a person’s de-radicalisation is difficult to assess. A risk is that only the 
participants in the treatment are observed and no actual picture of the effectivity of the 
method is reached. The operating model could not be documented during the operating 
period of Radinet. The project was complicated by changes of personnel, which resulted 
in different views inside the project of the way in which to lead the operation. In addition, 
the scientific foundation of the methods would have been deemed important especially in 
the exit work performed in prisons.
As a subsection of the Radinet service, the action plan brings up the prevention of radi-
calisation taking place in prisons. Radicalisation in prisons is one of the greatest concerns 
in Europe. According to the report by the Criminal Sanctions Agency, the perpetrators of 
crimes made for terroristic purposes have often already been previously convicted of an-
other crime.
The Criminal Sanctions Agency had a project to identify violent extremism and radicali-
sation in the Southern Finland during 1 August 2016–28 February 2018. In it, operating 
methods were developed by which the extremist radicalisation in prisons can be detected. 
As a part of the project, over 400 officials of the Criminal Sanctions Agency were trained in 
14 prisons and other units. During the project, the aim was also to improve the exchange 
of information inside the Criminal Sanctions Agency and between cooperation authori-
ties and other actors. The objective was to bring inmates already radicalised or at risk of 
becoming radicalised within the sphere of support functions. A report on the project was 
prepared. The project to identify violent extremism and radicalisation in the Southern Fin-
land criminal sanctions region.
3.1.4 Launching Helpline support service
The measure was not implemented. The Helpline support service was not launched be-
cause no resources were directed at it. 
Based on the interviews, there would be a need for the support service because currently 
there is no service where the family and friends could contact in case of concern. The re-
port by the National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs (SIA report) prepared on the Turku 
stabbings states that it is typical for the backgrounds of individuals performing a terror 
attack alone that their behaviour changes fairly quickly and the family and friends notice 
worrying signs. The family and friends can detect a change in a person’s behaviour and 
these observations would be valuable in preventing acts of violence.
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3.1.5 Promoting the actions of civic society organisations in developing 
services
In the action plan, the services produced by civic society organisations are deemed focal 
for the preventive work. Civic society organisations provide services facilitating disen-
gagement from violence, mentoring and other healthcare services that promote the dis-
engagement from ideologies accepting the use of violence, offering at the same time a 
way to non-violent social input. It was deemed in the action plan that persons interested 
in violent extremism and joining in extremist groups often do not trust authorities so the 
threshold to use the services provided by civic society organisations is lower. The funding 
of the civic society organisations’ work is not discussed in the action plan.
However, the question in the civic society organisations’ basic function is not necessary in 
the prevention of violent radicalisation. The civic society organisations’ operation as such 
promotes the participation by organising different kinds of action. With the help of pro-
jects, the civic society organisations can direct their operations more clearly to the preven-
tion of violent radicalisation. The role of civic society organisations in preventive work is 
defined most clearly when the actions are project-related.
A lot of people work in civic society organisations who have broad experience, for exam-
ple, in adult social services or support in disengagement from violence. The participation 
of these professionals in the prevention of violent extremism is deemed important. 
In addition to the earlier discussed Radinet service, civic society organisations do impor-
tant work locally. In Helsinki, Turku and Tampere, the Reach Out project by the Finn Church 
Aid was launched, which supports the cooperation between authorities, different religious 
communities and civic society organisations in the prevention of violent radicalisation and 
extremism. The objective of the cooperation is to find a support model for families.  Dur-
ing the project, international cooperation was participated in and the dissemination of 
good practices and cooperation between experts were supported. Reach Out has raised 
interest in other cities as well, and its operating models have been found good. In Turku, 
the Muslim Youth Forum has launched a MuVenna project, the aim of which is to prevent 
factors causing violent radicalisation among immigrants and young Muslims in Turku re-
gion. The project’s duration is 2018–2020, and it is funded by STEA.
The action plan tries to promote the spread of civic society organisations’ services sup-
porting the disengagement from violence to different geographic regions. Young men 
have been raised in the action plan especially for the reason that they are over-repre-
sented among the perpetrators and victims of crime. An example of an civic society organ-
isation working among men is Miestentalo Mattila in Tampere. Mattila focuses on increas-
ing participation and supporting welfare. Mattila has, besides open daytime activities, also 
various groups men can join based on their own field of interest.
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Based on the interviews, the activities of civic society organisations are mainly based on 
the local operating environment, and the services provided by civic society organisations 
vary from place to place. The goal would be a supply of civic society organisations’ services 
covering the entire country. During the interviews, the actors, without exception, deemed 
the role of civic society organisations important. Securing funding was regarded impor-
tant for the continuity and sustainability of the operation. Based on discussions held with 
local networks, the local cooperation promotes the knowledge of the civic society organi-
sation field, and steering people to the sphere of services provided by civic society organ-
isations is more fluent. Civic society organisations are involved in local cooperation in dif-
ferent ways depending on the location.
3.1.6 Increasing competency, expertise and awareness 
The compilation of training needs and the preparation of a training plan discussed in the 
action plan are deemed difficult because the training needs differ in different sectors and 
there are many parties offering training. As an idea, the survey of the training needs is re-
garded as good. The training relating to the phenomenon has been considered important, 
but in respect of training needs, the needs of actors in different sectors have been found 
to differ from each other.
Researchers and actors in different sectors are, according to their own areas of responsibil-
ity, responsible for promoting study that produces information to support the prevention 
of violent radicalisation and extremism. The scientific research has been increased based 
on the information received from professionals and the Ministry of Interior. In the inter-
views, the role of cross-sector scientific research and correct information was deemed an 
important aspect of increasing expertise. There is little scientific reading on the phenom-
enon. The situation reports published by the Ministry of the Interior are considered good 
among the existing sources.
A good example of increasing competency, expertise and awareness is the continuing ed-
ucation in the prevention of violent radicalisation organised by the University of Helsinki 
Centre for Continuing Education HY+ and funded by the Finnish National Agency for Edu-
cation, which is aimed at professionals in the education field. The purpose of the training 
is to disseminate researched data and create more versatile understanding in the themes 
of the subject.
Sector-specific research has been done, for example, by the social services, where the 
detection of violent radicalisation and extremism as well as the need for information 
have been examined. The results of the study are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Based on 
the study, it was noted that more scientific and high-quality information on violent ex-
tremism and radicalisation is needed in the social services. Due to the detected need for 
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information, a web training executed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the 
National Institute for Health and Welfare for professionals in the social sector has been 
planned to increase information on the phenomenon, its encounter, identification and 
prevention. A corresponding study is also planned for the professionals in the healthcare 
services. (Ritola, Väkivaltaisen ekstremismin ja radikalisoitumisen havaitseminen ja tiedon-
tarve sosiaalitoimessa, the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki, 2019).
Figure 1. Sources of information where the respondents have obtainded information on the phenomenon
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Figure 2. Need for additional information
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The National Police Board of Finland has directed and been responsible for the training 
within the police and relating to the Anchor model. During 2015–2017, a national train-
ing tour was realised where five trainers trained approximately 800 police officers on the 
themes of the subject matter. In addition, the National Police Board has arranged seminars 
to increase awareness. The police have also accepted the training of interest groups as 
their role. Based on the interviews, it came up that the police are requested to train on the 
phenomenon and subjects relating to safety across sectors. 
Seminars on the subject matter and relating to the roles of different actors are arranged. 
Local networks have organised seminars to increase competency, expertise and aware-
ness. The events have also been held as a good way to get to know other actors and 
receive more information on the services produced by the other actors. For examples, Ti-
etotalo seminars where violent radicalisation is discussed from the local point of view. In 
addition, sector-specific seminars have been held.
The participation in international events and training has been deemed successful. In the 
interviews, some international training or reference was without exception brought up 
where the successes reached were used as a basis in the planning or developing one’s own 
actions. Based on the interviews, international trainings were participated in especially 
through the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN).
In order to increase awareness, the purpose has been the implementation of an electronic 
toolbox to compile material in one place. No separate toolbox was launched during the 
action plan. The Anchor work website Ankkuritoiminta.fi functions currently as a good 
source for information and good practices.
3.1.7 Efficiently detecting and investigating hate crime and support for the 
victims of hate crime 
Finnish law does not define the concept of hate crime. According to the definition by the 
police and the action plan, hate crime generally refers to a crime against a person, group, a 
person’s property, institution, or a representative of these, motivated by prejudice or hos-
tility towards the victim’s real or perceived ethnic or national origin, religion or belief, sex-
ual orientation, gender identity or appearance, or disability or some similar characteristic. 
The police increased the prevention of hate crimes in 2017. One way of intensifying was 
the establishment of a national unit focusing on the prevention of hate speech in connec-
tion with the Helsinki police department, which investigates, among other things, all in-
citements made on the Internet of ethnic or religious hatred. Due to that, especially police 
reports of incitements against an ethnic group were written far more than in the previous 
years. The incitement against an ethnic group is a hate crime, but the possible connection 
of the action to violent extremism may be difficult to verify (Situation overview 1/2018 of 
violent extremism). The police have been trained in matters relating to hate crimes.
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Together with Victim Support Finland (VS) the Ministry of the Interior has implemented 
the EU’s ‘Good Practice +’ project which creates practices for supporting the victim of racist 
and hate crime. The project planned in the action plan was implemented, and also fol-
low-on projects were implemented.
It is stated in the action plan that religious communities and religious premises can also 
become the targets of hate speech and hate crime. The Finn Church Aid, working with re-
ligious communities, has developed the ‘Shoulder to Shoulder’ action. The model is based 
on the movement around the world where religious communities cooperate, show mutual 
solidarity and help each other especially when they are threatened. In the interviews, the 
Finn Church Aid’s work among the topic was deemed good and as promoting the cooper-
ation between actors.
3.1.8 Actions resulting from the increased number of asylum seekers
Measures have been directed at asylum seekers due to the increased number of them. In 
the subsection, the number of asylum seekers is reviewed in 2015. In addition, measures 
were directed at the persons being granted a residence permit and at their social inte-
gration. In this measure, the reception centre staff is trained and the safety of employees 
and persons subject to social integration is ensured. The reception centre staff has been 
trained a lot by the police and the Finnish Immigration Service. The police have also given 
instructions on how to act in worrying situations. The action has been boosted compared 
to the situation in 2016. The Finnish Immigration Service cooperates with other authorities 
both at the administrative level and locally with different actors and organisations. 
The so-called Tupa function was set up in the National Bureau of Investigation in 2016. 
One of its tasks is to develop the national multi-authority cooperation relating to the asy-
lum phenomenon.  During 2017, the Tupa function supported, among other things, the 
preparation of the national asylum situation picture and developed the exchange of infor-
mation between authorities.
It is stated in the SIA report prepared from the Turku stabbings that it would be important 
to offer a possibility for asylum seekers’ family and friends to express concern and ask for 
advice from a service like the helpline support service. It is recommended in the report 
that an advice service is set up that can be contact in cases of concern and that knows co-
operation partners, such as the police, religious communities and various parties offering 
help. 
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3.1.9 Preventive work through good, balanced and clear communications
The objective of the action is to use a manner that does not offend, label or radicalise 
any individuals or groups as supporters of violent extremism or, at the extreme, as terror-
ists. The party responsible for communications is named to be the National Cooperation 
Network for the Prevention of Violent Extremism. The national cooperation network has 
surveyed the situation relating to communications from the members of the cooperation 
partners, and discussion arose in respect of the action. However, the action cannot be 
deemed realised.  Finland has participated in the operation of ESCN European Strategic 
Communication network where experiences are exchanged and competency in commu-
nications relating to violent radicalisation and questions relating to propaganda are in-
creased.
In the interviews, the preparation of joint terminology was seen as a success even though 
it has not yet been taken into use by all actors in an established manner. The existence of 
clear and neutral terminology is deemed important so that in concerning situations the 
person causing concern is not labelled. The planned up-to-date material to support com-
munications has not been prepared by the national cooperation network.  
In the study, which surveyed the detection of violent extremism and radicalisation as well 
as the need for information in the social services, the respondents were found to have 
received the most information on the phenomenon from the media and the social media 
(Ritola, Väkivaltaisen ekstremismin ja radikalisoitumisen havaitseminen ja tiedontarve so-
siaalitoimessa, the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki, 2019). Well-bal-
anced and clear communications relating to the phenomenon are wished for, besides the 
information published by the media. In the interviews, the wish was expressed for receiv-
ing common instructions for the communications in crisis so that the communications by 
different authorities would be as consistent as possible. In this respect, the action has not 
been implemented.
3.1.10 Strengthening the ability of children and adolescents to identify, and 
guard against, violence-inducing messages 
The objective of the action is to strengthen the ability of children and adolescents to iden-
tify and reject messages and propaganda inducing violent radicalisation and extremism. 
The responsibility for the action lies with the Finnish National Board of Education and, in 
certain parts, with youth services and civic society organisations. The primary means of 
influencing at schools in order to reach the objective is the democracy education, media 
literacy education and the compliance with equality at schools. For example, in the cur-
riculum for basic education, the pupils are guided in social studies to act according to the 
values and principles of democracy in a multi-cultural society understanding differences 
and respecting human rights and equality. In addition to that, it is important to learn to 
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acquire and assess critically information produced by different actors as well as apply it to 
situations encountered. (Perusopetuksen opetussuunnitelman perusteet 2014). The values 
and targets included in the curricula do not only aim to affect the ability of children and 
adolescents to identify violence-inducing messages and propaganda but also to develop 
further the skills in critical thinking and media literacy skills. As for measures of violent 
extremism and the measures of the plan, a clear parallelism can be detected, as well as 
the similarity of objectives between the action plan and the structures of the education. 
In order to develop the ability of children and adolescents to identity and guard against 
violence-inducing messages and propaganda, teachers and other professionals in the 
education sector must understand the violent extremism as a phenomenon and have the 
readiness to discuss the matter with pupils. In the performance agreement between the 
Ministry of Education and Culture and the Finnish National Board of Education, the prior-
ities of the early education funded by the government and the personnel training of the 
education are determined. The priorities in 2017 were, among other things, the promotion 
of the social integration of asylum seekers and immigrants, language and culture-oriented 
education as well as the prevention of radicalisation. In 2018, the focus was, for example, 
the promotion of healthy and safe learning environment.
In respect of increasing competency, the focus in the education was not on training 
teachers especially to identify radicalised persons but on developing a learning culture 
promoting welfare and learning. Continuous education in the prevention of violent rad-
icalisation at schools is available for teachers and other professionals in the education 
sector. The continuous training by the professionals in education (HY+) provides a train-
ing programme preventing violent radicalisation at schools, by which the competency of 
professionals participating is increased through study-based information. The purpose is 
to increase expertise as well as share competency and information. Similar university-level 
training to professionals working within the subject is not offered in any other sectors 
than in the education sector.
The Finnish National Board of Education has also published guidebooks and online mate-
rials on the subject to the professionals in the education sector, for example, a guidebook 
to strengthen democratic involvement and prevent hate speech and violent radicalism 
in 2017. The Finnish National Board of Education has in 2018 initiated measures by which 
the ability to counter extremist thinking in early education as a part of strengthening the 
safety and wellbeing of children is increased. Children displaying symptoms are also seen 
in early education, and outside of schools, the parents of the children are also daily en-
countering such. The basics of the early education plan also take into account the demo-
cratic values, such as equality. The representation of early education has joined the opera-
tion of the national cooperative network during the implementation of the current action 
plan.
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The Regional State Administrative Agencies have also launched regional networks pro-
moting the safety culture of learning environments, the purpose of which is to further the 
cooperation between and within municipalities, multi-professional cooperation, disclose 
up-to-date information and good practices as well as maintain situational awareness at 
local, regional and national levels of the safety of the learning environments of municipali-
ties and other education organisers.
The national cooperation network also tried to strengthen the participation of the youth. 
Representatives of youth organisations are represented in the network, and they develop 
measures as a part of their own activity to prevent violent radicalism. A good example is 
the MuVenna project by the Muslim Youth Forum in Turku.
3.1.11 The particular responsibilities of the police
The police have been given particular responsibilities based on the duties of the policy ac-
cording to section 1 of the Police Act, which are to secure the rule of law, maintain public 
order and security, prevent, detect and investigate crimes, and submit cases to prosecu-
tors for consideration of charges. The police work in cooperation with other public author-
ities and with communities and residents in order to maintain security, and they engage in 
international cooperation pertaining to their duties. The action plan emphasises that the 
police are comprehensively cognisant of their particular responsibility in preventing and 
countering violent radicalisation and extremism. Especially after the Turku stabbings, the 
National Police Board and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service developed the han-
dling of leads concerning terrorism and violence in cooperation with all police units.
The purpose is to develop the Anchor model, and the prevention of violent radicalisation 
and extremism have been included as part of the pre-emptive action, in addition to which 
the aim has been to expand the Anchor model to all police departments. The principles of 
the Anchor model have been documented when the Anchor handbook was prepared. The 
website Ankkuritoiminta.fi is operating, and materials to support the work of professionals 
from different sectors have been collected on the site.
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3.1.12 Measures aimed against different forms of violent radicalisation and 
extremism
The different forms of violent radicalisation and extremism, referred to in the action plan, 
are violent far right, violent far left and religiously motivated violent radicalisation and ex-
tremism.
Changes in the operating environment; for examples, trips to the combat zones of Syria 
had reduced from the situation in 2016 when the action plan was prepared. After the 
Turku stabbing, a strong discussion against immigrants and asylum seekers arose within 
the far right. The actions in connection with protests have been developed, and training 
relating to the rejection of polarisation has been launched. The operating model accepted 
by the ministerial working group for internal security and administration of justice for 
dealing with those returning from combat zones has been implemented.
Research on the non-parliamentary far right movement and anti-immigration was done in 
the University of Helsinki (Sallamaa, Ulkoparlamentaarinen äärioikeistoliikehdintä ja maa-
hanmuuttovastaisuus 2010-luvun Suomessa, the Faculty of Social Studies of the University 
of Helsinki, 2018)
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4 Successes, challenges and development 
targets of cooperation
4.1 Reaching national short-term goals
The national short-term goals for preventing violent radicalisation and extremism, which 
have been set in the action plan, are as follows: 
National structures based on multi-professional cooperation are in place. The national 
cooperation network and the steering groups of projects have an important significance 
in making it possible for different actors to find each other, in improving the exchange of 
information at the national level and deepening the cooperation.  Nationally we have suc-
ceeded in finding active organisations, which bring a valuable practical view on discus-
sions, for example, from the youth and religious communities.
At the local level, the most important steps of progress can be deemed the development 
in the operation and Anchor model of local cooperation networks. The development of 
cooperation between different authorities and civic society organisations has been made 
possible in the cooperation networks. The relationships created in the networks are use-
ful in a wider sense as well because the actors will see that actions are taken too often in 
one’s own bunkers, and it is important that the threshold to contact another authority de-
creases. A weakness in the local level structures is deemed the disunity of different operat-
ing models and local differences in the implementation of models.
GOAL 1: National and local structures and procedures based on multi-professional 
cooperation are in place which makes it possible for the authorities, civic society 
organisations and communities to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism.
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The assessment of the realisation of the goal is important because the statistics of the vol-
ume of crimes have differed between police departments. Several entries may have been 
written down on the same event or one entry may contain several separate actions from 
the same event. In 2017, almost 100 crime labels were identified in the police’s police re-
port system, which were suspected to relate to violent extremism. Hate crimes, which are 
motivated by hatred or racism may also be extremist crimes. The number of these crimes 
clearly increased from 2016 to 2017. This is at least partially explained by the police’s addi-
tional investment in making the interference in hate crimes more efficient.
GOAL 2: The volume of ideologically motivated crime will continue to decrease year 
by year.
GOAL 3: The number of those travelling to conflict areas for the purpose of engaging 
in combat/violence will start to go down from its peak. The starting point is the 
situation on 1 November 2015.
Upon the publication of the action plan, over 70 persons travelling to conflict areas were 
identified. At the beginning of 2018, approximately 80 of those persons travelling to the 
conflict areas of Syria and Iraq had been identified. The actual number is probably slightly 
more. Leaving for the conflict areas has in practice lessened along with ISIL facing military 
losses. 
GOAL 4: Those returning from conflict areas are identified. The ones having committed 
crimes will be brought to justice. All returning persons will be systematically targeted 
with individually tailored measures which reduce the risk of violence and help 
improve their ability to cope.
According to the Ministry of the Interior the goal has mainly been achieved. The operating 
model based on the authorities’ cooperation for the handling of those returning from con-
flict areas was approved in spring 2017. The objective is to clarify what each person return-
ing did while in the conflict areas. 
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The Government gave additional funding for more efficient interference in hate speech 
and hate crimes.in 2017. Approximately 40 police officers have been trained to identify 
and prevent hate crimes in accordance with the training against hate crimes (TAHCLE). 
These police officers have shared what they learned in their own police units. Th volume 
of hate crimes known to the police in 2017 increased by eight per cent from the previous 
year. As much as 80% of hate speech and harassment remains unreported so the identifi-
cation and support of victims is difficult (Victim Support Finland, Victims’ experiences of 
hate crimes in Finland during 2014–2018.
4.2 The roles and tasks of the actors
Among other things, the National Police Board and the Finnish Immigration Service work-
ing under the Ministry of the Interior as well as the Finnish National Board of Education 
working under the Ministry of Education and Culture play an important role in the action 
plan. On the other hand, the social and healthcare services arranged by municipalities 
have a significant role in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. The ex-
tent of the action plan and the roles of different branches of administration force into the 
fact that the guiding impact of the plan is principally based on the tasks set out each actor 
to themselves, which are then written down in the action plan.
The targets set by the actors for themselves are partially of very different levels. A part 
of the measures can be seen as strategic-level measures, whereas a part of the measures 
focus in more detail in individual matters. The interviews transmit that the actors have ac-
tively discussed what their roles in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism 
are. All interviewed actors had considered what the preventive work means for them. The 
development of thought is evident in the fact that new measures have arisen even later 
on, even though they were not included in the action plan. 
The formation of a clear role has been the most difficult for those actors who are seldom in 
daily life affected by violent extremism. For example, in the education sector, discussions 
were held concerning how common this phenomenon is and how it presents itself in prac-
tical work. The role of the early education in the preventive work was understood fairly 
late. Correspondingly, among the police and the Criminal Sanctions Agency, extremism is 
more visible as a phenomenon so understanding it and the measures aimed at it are easier 
to perceive.
GOAL 5: The police will efficiently detect and investigate hate crimes.  The victims of 
hate crime will be supported and the impacts of crime on the victim’s reference group 
will be identified.
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The role in the prevention of radicalisation is seen by the abovementioned actors differ-
ently. In the education sector, the role is strongly focused on the general development of 
critical thinking, on the improvement of media literacy and on the ability of the youth to 
counter violence-inducing messages. Such goals are aimed at a wider part of the popula-
tion, which is not at an immediate radicalisation risk. The attention by the police and the 
Criminal Sanctions Agency is clearly stronger on the risk groups of radicalisation and on 
the already-radicalised persons. In which case also the measures taken to prevent radicali-
sation are at a very different level. Thus, it can be said that there are very different levels in 
the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism, depending on whether the mat-
ter is measures directed at the entire population or at persons already in the radicalisation 
process. In future, construing the discussion according to the radicalisation level could 
clarify the discussion and through that the roles of different actors.
4.3 Information and competency
At the latest after the Turku stabbings, the need for information on violent extremism has 
been recognised, and the subject is no longer deemed as solely the police’s duty. At least 
additional information on the phenomenon, understanding the concept, receiving the cor-
rect information and operating procedures in a worrisome situation have been identified as 
the need for training. Generally, a good addition to the competency is regarded to be gain-
ing a wider understanding on the phenomenon and better readiness to discuss the sub-
ject as well as the availability of scientific and correct information from reliable sources. The 
increase in competency is sought after especially in respect of one’s own work and practical 
situations, for example, a teacher wishes to increase his or her readiness to discuss radi-
calised groups with his or her students. In the current situation, the goals of training and 
actual training needs are not clear. In some sectors, the training needs have been clarified, 
and in the most sectors the clarification of the training needs have been planned.
Increasing one’s own competency and expertise in the prevention of violent radicalisa-
tion and extremism is challenging because the actors’ need for information varies sector 
by sector, locally and according to the job description. The prevention of extremism is 
deemed basic work only by a few working within the subject matter. Trainings by sectors 
can respond to the correct need as the scope and content of the training can be planned 
in a targeted manner. In addition to the sector-specific trainings, the training need at the 
local level arose in several interviews. At the local level, training could be arranged to all 
employees in social services, healthcare, youth services and education sector in the mu-
nicipality, with the help of which the roles and tasks of local actors as well as the operating 
models in situations of concern will be understood. 
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Among the participants, the HY+ continuous education has been deemed an excellent 
way to receive information and increase one’s own expertise. Offering wider training to all 
at grassroots level is, however, probably not a realistic target; instead the availability of the 
training and updated knowledge should be settled in a manner suitable for the current 
structures.
Good practices are shared among the cooperation network based on the successes 
reached in one’s own operation. However, good practices do not currently efficiently 
adapt to operating models. The implementation of practices found good elsewhere is not 
always felt necessary if one’s own operation is already deemed functional as things cur-
rently stand.
4.4 Cooperation in practice
The cooperation in practice refers to multi-professional cooperation and cooperation be-
tween civic society organisations and authorities. Cooperation is important because if a 
person moves between the services of different actors, there is a risk that the situation pic-
ture and the service chain are broken. A successful example of multi-professional cooper-
ation is the Anchor model where the problems of an adolescent are sought to be solved 
multi-professionally with the help of a more diverse toolbox than that which the police 
alone could offer. The aim is to break the criminal career of the youth right at its beginning 
by focusing on the root causes.
The challenge in the Anchor model is bringing the operating model to different locations. 
In many big locations, there already exist forms of cooperation that are deemed func-
tional. In that event the willingness to start developing a new operating model is low. In 
smaller locations, resources to arrange action are, then again, smaller. As a solution for 
this, Anchor models of different levels were developed in which case the operation can be 
brought even to smaller places.
In the cooperation in practice, building trust is decisive. This is especially emphasised 
when the question is of a civic society organisation. A civic society organisation must be 
able to convince that it can act qualitatively and reliably. In respect of civic society organ-
isations, the authorities have to consider whether the risk is that the civic society organi-
sation’s actions, for example, in helping a radicalised person, cause more harm than good. 
From the point of view of the authorities, the fragmentation of the field of civic society 
organisations becomes a challenge. Many civic society organisations do not function na-
tionally, whereby the cooperation must be built locally.
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The cooperation between civic society organisations and authorities is at its best when it is 
flexible and utilises the strengths of both parties. Especially among immigrants, prejudices 
against authorities are met, and a civic society organisation might more easily gain trust. 
Civic society organisations can offer such support as can be important but which does not 
directly belong to the authorities’ job description. In practice, civic society organisations 
can promote participation within the society, add information on services available by the 
authorities and assist in many practical matters.
A challenge in the cooperation in practice is also the borders between municipalities. 
While people fluently move across municipality borders, for example, in the Helsinki met-
ropolitan area, the municipal services do not necessarily keep up. This creates possibilities 
for a radicalised person to avoid the authorities if the authorities cannot be agile enough 
in the distribution of information. The distribution of information is generally deemed as 
one of the biggest challenges in the cooperation concerning the preventive work.
The exchange of information between different actors is difficult because the disclosure 
of information between different authorities is regulated and, according to the interviews, 
the regulation is interpreted differently by different authorities. The interviews also pro-
vided that in many cases, the discussion multi-professionally would be sufficient at a more 
general level. Discussions could be held without disclosing confidential information or act-
ing contrary to law and work instructions.
The cooperation may be withheld also due to the fact that understanding a single actor’s 
tasks and the total picture of the cooperation between actors is challenging. Based on the 
interviews, the parties involved in the action no longer perceive what the other partici-
pants’ role in the preventive work is, even if their own role were clear to them.
According to the interviews, potential is seen in the deepening of the cooperation in prac-
tice by sector-specific cooperation networks. The increase in the sector or actor-specific 
information and competency already exists in the form of various trainings and seminars 
but especially in the interviews of persons in customer service, wider possibilities to in-
crease good practices and competency were wished for.
4.5 Local operation
Local cooperation networks for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism are 
operating in Helsinki, Tampere, Turku and Oulu. In all these cities, the cooperation group 
convenes several times a year. The compositions of the groups vary from city to city, as do 
the focus areas of the operation. In Helsinki, Tampere and Oulu, representatives of civic 
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society organisations are involved whereas in Turku, civic society organisations are not 
permanent representatives in the cooperation group. It is considered in Turku that achiev-
ing as open discussion as possible is important that, thus, the composition of civil servants 
is justified. In the cities where civic society organisations are involved, it is deemed that 
civic society organisations have an important role in the cooperation and their participa-
tion has not significantly impeded the openness of discussions.
The local collaboration differs in the cities involved, even greatly. Based on the interviews, 
one reason for the difference seems to the formation of the local cooperation network from 
different starting points, in which case the network and its operation have tried to cor-
respond to the then current needs of the operating environment. In Tampere, Turku and 
Oulu, the phenomenon is approached purely from the point of view of the prevention of 
violent radicalisation and extremism, whereas in Helsinki the group approaches the sub-
ject through general security, and radicalisation is only one of the themes. The phenome-
non presents itself differently in different cities, and local events affect it strongly. The Turku 
stabbings and the Oulu sexual crimes are events that have a great impact on the operat-
ing environment. For example, the events in Oulu have led to increased threat of violence 
against minorities and added hate speech that has also been directed at the authorities.
A part of the networks are led by the police whereas in other locations, the city takes the lead. 
Due to the actors’ different basic tasks, the needs of the police and the city for the cooperation 
network may differ from each other. Common in all cooperation networks is the creation and 
distribution of the local situation picture. The police and the Finnish Security Intelligence Ser-
vice has a major role in distributing the situation picture. Persons employed in youth services, 
social and welfare services and at schools and learning institutions also are given a channel to 
transmit their concerns and as for their part enlighten the situation picture.
The most important value in the local cooperation is to see that persons working for differ-
ent authorities and civic society organisations learn to know each other, and the under-
standing of the phenomenon improves. This furthers cooperation, not only relating to 
extremism but also wider as part of local cooperation. Based on the discussions held with 
local networks, the local cooperation enhances the knowing of the civic society organisa-
tion sector and the guidance to the services of the civic society organisations takes place 
more smoothly. The civic society organisations are involved in the local operation in differ-
ent ways depending on the location.
The challenge at the local level is the small number of concrete measures. As positive ex-
amples of joint projects in networks can be regarded the process scheme When Concern 
Arises in Tampere, where the aim has been to jointly solve the existing problem in the 
preventive work, and the Case City Center in Helsinki, the objective of which was to have a 
positive change in a shopping centre found in a state of unrest for a long time. 
37
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2019:19 ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE PREVENTION OF 
 VIOLENT RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM BY THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
4.6 Recommendations
In the assessed practical implementation of the action plan, different actors have been 
exhaustively taken into account, even though all actors were not brought up in the actual 
action plan. For example, the role of early education was realised in the middle of the im-
plementation of the plan. The importance of the role of early education is highlighted by 
the fact that when children are small, the contact with their parents is much closer than 
compared to the school age. This increases the possibility to further the development 
of children’s safe growth environment at the earliest possible phase. On the other hand, 
harmful attitudes inherited from parents are recognised in children very early on. Corre-
spondingly, the Finnish Defence Forces are not involved in the measures of the plan. How-
ever, their representative actively participates at least in the local cooperation groups of 
Helsinki, Turku and Tampere. In future, the role of these actors should be made more visi-
ble in the action plan.
In addition to that, the roles of different actors in the prevention of violent radicalisation 
and extremism should be clarified. As for the key persons within the authorities, their own 
role towards the action plan is understood well. Achieving the understanding of the basic 
level within the actor’s own organisation as well as outside one’s immediate operating en-
vironment is more difficult. The actors have difficulties in forming a total picture of what 
different actors concretely do for the prevention of violent extremism, and how these dif-
ferent actions are linked together.
A large part of the measures of the plan is focused on what one actor may do to prevent 
the phenomenon. This facilitates the management of the implementation of the meas-
ures but causes a risk that the measures remain dispersed and gaps remain between the 
actors. It was brought in the interviews that the biggest risk for failure in the preventive 
work is when a person is transferred from one actor to the responsibility of another. Even 
though, for example, in the Interface Project1 launched in May 2018 tackles this problem, 
an operating model based on cooperation should also be adopted as a wider principle. For 
example, in the action plan, the significance of the Criminal Sanctions Agency has been 
recognised because inmates are in many ways in a vulnerable position and susceptible 
to radicalisation. The investments of the Criminal Sanctions Agency on the prevention of 
1  Ministry of the Interior report: Observations and recommendations for local collaboration on referral mechanism 
of persons of concern in local multi-stakenholder collaboratioin for preventing violent radicalisation
RECOMMENDATION 1: Clarifying the interfaces between the actors and, thus, describing 
the roles between the actors in more detail in the new action plan.
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radicalisation have been significant. However, less attention has been given in the action 
to how the integration of inmates into the society takes place after the end of their time in 
prison. The measures by one actor on these kinds of problems are typically not sufficient; 
instead cooperation, for example, between the Criminal Sanctions Agency, cities, the so-
cial services, the police and organisations are required.
The definitions of radicalisation and violent extremism forming the basis of the plan start 
from the idea that violence, the threat of violence or the encouragement to violence 
are extreme if they are justified by an ideology. The definition does not take a stand on 
whether the ideology refers to interpretations, for example, on people groups, the world 
or religion. It is deemed important among the actors that violent extremism is not seen 
only as a religious phenomenon but that the violent actions justified by the ideologies of 
the far right and the far left similarly concern violent extremism. A wider approach has an 
important message. Violence or threatening of it is not accepted regardless of by what it is 
justified. It also has significance for the practical work. It is, for example, easier to include 
religious communities in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism when the 
starting point is not the idea that the phenomenon would only be limited to violence jus-
tified by religion.
It is important to invest in successful encounters in measures targeted at persons at risk of 
becoming radicalised or who are already radicalised. It is important to take into account 
in the structures how the actors are profiled. For example, the focus of Radinet only on 
radicalisation may cause problems in how the help is seen among the close circle of the 
person being helped. The said problematics are, for example, seen in prisons. If an inmate 
seeking help is deemed radicalised, the threshold to seek help may become high. The 
wider point of view of the Anchor, which is directed at the youth, on problems does not 
cause a similar problem. The actors must be able to solve how the problems of a person 
causing concern are tackled without labelling the person in his or her own social net-
works. A good example of that is seizing the concern in the school world as a part of wider 
care for the person’s wellbeing. 
RECOMMENDATION 2: Emphasising the cooperation between actors by forming 
measures exceeding actor borders where the actions are developed despite the 
border fences between the actors.
RECOMMENDATION 3: Taking into account in the structures and education that a 
radicalised person is encountered successfully, taking into consideration how and by 
whom the possibly radicalised encounter takes place without adding a single person’s 
risk becoming radicalised.
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Various authorities have arranged a lot of training and in all sectors. Despite the fact that 
a lot of training has been arranged, there is still a demand for it. The training is also de-
manded among those persons who do not daily encounter radicalised persons or even 
persons in a risk group but to whom it would be important to have the basic skills to un-
derstand the phenomenon and act when a situation arises. In future, even more attention 
should be paid in the training to what kinds of training needs different groups have, be-
cause the resources for trainings are limited. The training and participation in trainings are 
often away from the daily work, so it is important that the content and objectives of the 
trainings are closely considered.
The problem of the civic society organisations’ work, also otherwise than within the scope 
of this plan, is the lack of funding. Civic society organisations are largely operated on a 
voluntary basis, and the hired persons often work in the projects. Their problem is the 
fragmentary funding that causes problems especially in an operating environment where 
long-term operation that is based on the trust between persons is important. The discus-
sions should also be opened on who the correct party is to fund the work of the civic soci-
ety organisations in this sector. At stake is on one hand how the civic society organisations’ 
work can be guided according to those objectives that the financier wishes to promote 
and on the other hand that the funding should be to such extent independent that the 
civic society organisations plausibility as independent actors remains.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The training of practical actors should have more exact 
objectives and priorities so that the lacking resources are directed correctly. The 
planned web-based trainings and self-study packages may for their part assist in the 
situation.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The arrangement of the civic society organisations’ funding so 
that the continuity of the operations is secured and the knowhow accrued during the 
project can be utilised.
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